Meet the Taliban or I Can't Believe I'm Losing to These Guys

Newsweek has run a fascinating story called The Taliban In Their Own Words, which is kind of like a Behind the Music tale of insurgent thugs. Some in the comment section criticized Newsweek for painting the Taliban in a sympathetic light, and clearly the Taliban version of history has to be taken with a huge grain of salt, but ultimately this is a perspective we never hear. I'd consider that newsworthy.

The first common theme to emerge from the various storytellers is how deflated the initial NATO/American invasion left them. The image of a past and future Taliban commander selling potatoes on the penny in a small village could be in any epic action movie. So how did things fall apart for the occupying forces?

The Americans and their Afghan allies made mistakes after mistake, killing and arresting innocent people. There was one village in Dayak district near Ghazni City where the people had communist backgrounds, from the days of the Russians, and had never supported us. But the police raided the village, beat the elders at a mosque and arrested them, accusing them of being Taliban. They were freed after heavy bribes were paid. After that incident the whole village sent us a message asking forgiveness for the abuses of the communist era.

For those debating whether the Taliban is tied to foreign fundamentalist operatives or a home-grown operation, the oral history provides fascinating insight. While foreign nationals established many of the guerrilla insurgency operations, Afghan Taliban eventually displaced them in number, leadership, and today no longer even whole-heartedly welcome their presence:

Those first groups crossing the border were almost totally sponsored, organized, and led by Arab mujahedin. The Afghan Taliban were weak and disorganized. But slowly the situation began to change. American operations that harassed villagers, bombings that killed civilians, and Karzai's corrupt police and officials were alienating villagers and turning them in our favor. Soon we didn't have to hide so much on our raids. We came openly. When they saw us, villagers started preparing green tea and food for us. The tables were turning. Karzai's police and officials mostly hid in their district compounds like prisoners.

Again, taking these comments with a big grain of salt, the oral histories explain both difficulties NATO forces will have in winning the war, in any conventional sense, and also why winning the war might be less important to our national security than we think:

We still worry about helicopters and bombers, but we are suffering fewer American night raids. I think they just don't have the intelligence they used to have. Fewer people are willing to cooperate with them and betray us.
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Personally I think all this talk about Al Qaeda being strong is U.S. propaganda. As far as I know, Al Qaeda is weak, and they are few in numbers. Now that we control large amounts of territory, we should have a strict code of conduct for any foreigners working with us. We can no longer allow these camels to roam freely without bridles and control.

This a story of back-country people who fervently believe god is on their side. Their commitment is to the death. The day will come when we admit that they want this mountainous desert more than we do. An interesting read worth your ten minutes.